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ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE: Payment for performance fi nancial incentive schemes reward 
doctors based on the quality and the outcomes of their treatment. In Brazil, the 
Ministry of Health is looking to scale up its use in public hospitals and some 
municipalities are developing payment for performance schemes even for the 
Family Health Programme. In this article the Quality and Outcomes Framework 
used in the UK since 2004 is discussed, as well as its experience to elaborate 
some important lessons that Brazilian municipalities should consider before 
embarking on payment for performance scheme in primary care settings.
Descriptors: Physicians, Primary Care. Family Health Program. 
Motivation. Reward. Quality Assurance, Health Care.
RESUMO
OBJETIVO: Esquemas de pagamento para desempenho recompensam o 
médico baseado na qualidade e no resultado do tratamento dos seus pacientes. 
O Ministério da Saúde brasileiro analisa seu uso em hospitais públicos e alguns 
municípios estão desenvolvendo estratégias de pagamento por desempenho para 
o Programa de Saúde da Família. No artigo discute-se o Quality and Outcomes 
Framework – esquema de pagamento para desempenho usado no Reino Unido 
desde 2004, bem como sua experiência para elaborar algumas lições importantes 
que os municípios brasileiros devem considerar antes de empreender o esquema 
de pagamento por desempenho na atenção primária.
Descritores: Médicos de Atenção Primária. Programa Saúde da Família. 
Motivação. Recompensa. Garantia da Qualidade dos Cuidados de 
Saúde.
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Although there is much variation in its defi nition and 
approach, several developing country health systems 
have experimented with payment for performance 
(P4P) schemes.6 These are fi nancial incentive schemes 
that reward doctors based on the quality and the 
outcomes of their treatment. The better the quality, the 
more they are paid.
The Brazilian Ministry of Health is looking to scale 
up its use for civil servants and in public hospitalsa 
and some municipalities are developing P4P schemes 
even for the Family Health Programme (e.g. Prefeitura 
Municipal do Belo Horizonte; Prefeitura Municipal do 
Rio de Janeiro). The recent 11th Congress for Family 
and Community Medicine had an entire panel discus-
sion dedicated to the subject.b
This article aimed to discuss payment for performance, 
by drawing on the eight years of experience that the UK 
has had with their system of payment for the Quality 
and Outcomes Framework (QOF) performance. If P4P 
is to be used in the Family Health Programme, it would 
be worthwhile to learn from the pitfalls and challenges 
that have been experienced in the UK and potentially 
avoid replicating mistakes.
QOF AND LESSONS FROM THE UK P4P 
SCHEME
The payment of quality of care incentives to general 
practitioners (GPs) in the UK is one of the great revo-
lutions in primary health care in the last 20 years. First 
implemented in 2004, GPs receive fi nancial rewards on 
top of their salaries if they manage to reach certain targets 
in healthcare quality, process and outcome. There are 134 
different targets that the GPs are paid to achieve in the 
QOF.c The targets cover clinical, organizational, patient 
experience and additional service domains (Table). Each 
target is allocated a number of points depending on how 
challenging it is and GP practices are rewarded up to 
1,000 points each year for reaching the targets. Every 
point attained equates to a payment of £126.00 to the GP.
INTRODUCTION
a Ministério da Saúde (BR). Portaria no1.537, de 4 de Julho 2011. Altera a Portaria no 3.627/GM/MS, de 19 de novembro de 2010, que fi xa 
os critérios e procedimentos específi cos de avaliação de desempenho individual e institucional para efeito de pagamento da Gratifi cação de 
Desempenho da Carreira do Plano Geral de Cargos do Poder Executivo (GDPGPE), da Gratifi cação de Desempenho da Previdência, da Saúde 
e do Trabalho (GDPST) e da Gratifi cação de Desempenho de Pesquisa e Investigação Biomédica em Saúde Pública (GDPIB), devida aos 
servidores do quadro de pessoal do Ministério da Saúde pertencentes ao Plano Geral de Cargos do Poder Executivo,à Carreira da Previdência, 
da Saúde e do Trabalho e ao Plano de Carreiras e Cargos de Pesquisa e Investigação Biomédica em Saúde Pública, respectivamente. Diario 
Ofi cial Uniao. 05 jul 2001;Seção1:37. 
b Anais do 11º Congresso Nacional de Medicina da Família e Comunidade; 2011; Brasília; BR, Brasília: Sociedade Brasileira de Medicina da 
Família e Comunidade; 2011.
c National Health Service (UK). Information Centre. Quality and Outcomes Framework Achievement Data 2009/10. London; 2010[cited 2011 
Jul 12]. Available from: http://www.ic.nhs.uk/webfi les/QOF/2009-10/QOF_Achievement_Prevalence_Bulletin_2009-10_v1.0.pdf
d National Collaborating Centre for Chronic Conditions. Type 2 diabetes: national clinical guideline for management in primary and 
secondary care (update). London: Royal College of Physicians; 2008[cited 2011 Jul 12]. Available from: http://www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/
live/11983/40803/40803.pdf
e Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network. Management of diabetes. Edinburgh; 2010[cited 2011 Jul 12]. Available from: http://www.sign.
ac.uk/guidelines/fulltext/116/index.html
f National Health Service (UK). Quality and Outcomes Framework guidance for GMS contract 2011/12: Delivering investment 
in general practice. London; 2011[cited 2011 Jul 12]. Available from: http://www.nhsemployers.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/
QOFguidanceGMScontract_2011_12_FL%2013042011.pdf
Selecting indicators is a complex and dynamic process 
that is the responsibility of four organizations in the UK 
QOF. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) identifi es whether reaching defi ned targets in 
clinical care quality could result in signifi cant public 
health impact. The University of York calculates the 
cost-benefi t of paying for doctors to reach the target. 
Two National Health Service (NHS) departments (the 
NHS Information Centre and NHS Evidence) consider 
whether systems are in place for GPs to collect data 
on progress towards the target and the implications, in 
terms of workload, in doing so.
For example, if the blood pressure of diabetic patients is 
well controlled, this can lead to better health outcomes, 
avoid hospitalizations, and complications.d,e One of the 
new diabetes targets in the QOF, replacing the DM12 
indicator, is the indicator DM30 and is worth 8 points.f A 
GP should maintain the blood pressure in his/her diabetic 
patients at under 150/90. If the GP reaches the defi ned 
target of 71% i.e. 71% of the GP’s diabetic patients have 
a record of successfully maintaining their blood pressure 
at less than this level, then the GP practice will receive 
£1,000.00 (8 points multiplied by £126.00).
The fi nancial rewards are only for GP practices, not 
secondary care specialists, and so the indicators are 
chosen in areas that are sensitive to primary care 
services, i.e., where primary care has a direct and clear 
responsibility for the continuous care and management 
of the condition; in areas where there is evidence that 
good care at the primary care level results in positive 
and benefi cial outcomes; and in areas where the disease 
is a public health priority. The UK has invested over 
£1billion in the QOF so far. GPs income has risen by 
60% in the last eight years and 20% of GPs’ salaries 
are directly derived from the fi nancial payments made 
from the incentive scheme. GP performance, as iden-
tifi ed through the QOF, is published annually and is 
publically accessible. This adds considerable pressure 
for GPs to perform to a high standard, reaching the set 
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targets, because patients are able to choose which GP 
they are registered with in the UK.
The Impact of the QOF
Despite this investment in GP performance, there are 
divergent views as to whether the QOF has had any 
meaningful impact on public health.4,12 In part, this 
is because of limitations in research study design and 
the fact that the QOF was implemented throughout the 
country – there are no control settings.12 Nonetheless, 
the wide variation in quality of care by GP practices 
experienced prior to the implementation of the QOF has 
decreased across all QOF domains. This has dispropor-
tionately benefi tted poorer areas and so by implication 
health inequalities have actually improved as a result 
of the QOF.5,12 The QOF led to overall improvements 
in clinical care quality specifi cally for asthma and 
diabetes in the fi rst two years of its use.2 Conversely, 
these improvements levelled off once targets had been 
reached and there was a worsening of continuity of 
care measures.2 Despite the QOF, ethnic disparities still 
persist in the management of cardiovascular disease9 
and it has had a minimal impact on hospitalizations.1 
Improvements in some clinical outcomes, such as 
hypertension management, had been occurring even 
before the incentive scheme was introduce.10
Lessons from the QOF
Paying doctors extra for achieving a higher standard of 
care for their patients could be an interesting approach 
for the Family Health Programme as it might reduce 
the current variation in quality experienced across the 
country. However, there are important pitfalls and chal-
lenges in the experience of P4P in the UK that should be 
considered before implementing these schemes.
Developing the indicator set
Choosing a good indicator requires a trade off between 
several features: the scope of the indicator, the target to 
be reached, its value in terms of fi nancial reward and 
when it will be retired or replaced. This process is a 
politico-institutional one in the QOF and whilst NICE, 
York University, NHS Information and NHS Evidence 
work hard to create fair yet relevant indicators, based on 
the best available evidence, professional lobbying groups 
infl uence which indicators get adopted and which do not. 
Care needs to be taken to ensure that there is consensus 
around indicator development. The legitimacy of P4P 
Table. Quality and Outcomes Framework indicators for diabetes. United Kingdom, 2009-2010.
Code Indicator
DM 2 The percentage of patients with diabetes whose notes record body mass index in the previous 15 months. 
DM 5 The percentage of patients with diabetes who have a record of HbA1c or equivalent in the previous 15 months
DM 9
The percentage of patients with diabetes with a record of the presence or absence of peripheral pulses in the 
previous 15 months. 
DM 10 The percentage of patients with diabetes with a record of neuropathy testing in the previous 15 months. 
DM 11 The percentage of patients with diabetes who have a record of the blood pressure in the previous 15 months. 
DM 12 The percentage of patients with diabetes in whom the last blood pressure is 145/85 or less. 
DM 13
The percentage of patients with diabetes who have a record of micro-albuminuria testing in the previous 15 
months (exception reporting for patients with proteinuria).
DM 15
The percentage of patients with diabetes with a diagnosis of proteinuria or micro-albuminuria who are treated 
with angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitors (or A2 antagonists).
DM 16 The percentage of patients with diabetes who have a record of total cholesterol in the previous 15 months. 
DM 17
The percentage of patients with diabetes whose last measured total cholesterol within the previous 15 months 
is 5mmol/l or less. 
DM 18
The percentage of patients with diabetes who have had infl uenza immunisation in the preceding 1 September 
to 31 March. 
DM 19
The practice can produce a register of all patients aged 17 years and over with diabetes mellitus, which 
specifi es whether the patient has Type 1 or Type 2 diabetes. 
DM 21 The percentage of patients with diabetes who have a record of retinal screening in the previous 15 months. 
DM 22
The percentage of patients with diabetes who have a record of estimated glomerular fi ltration rate or serum 
creatinine testing in the previous 15 months.
DM 23
The percentage of patients with diabetes in whom the last HbA1c is 7 or less (or equivalent test/reference range 
depending on local laboratory) in the previous 15 months. 
DM 24
The percentage of patients with diabetes in whom the last HbA1c is 8 or less (or equivalent test/reference range 
depending on local laboratory) in the previous 15 months. 
DM 25
The percentage of patients with diabetes in whom the last HbA1c is 9 or less (or equivalent test/reference range 
depending on local laboratory) in the previous 15 months. 
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targets can be undermined if there is not suffi cient 
buy-in from clinicians. Setting the target too high and 
the doctors will not get rewarded. Too low, and it will 
not discriminate between the high and low performers. 
None of the 134 targets are set at 100% and the GP will 
receive a fi nancial reward for most of the indicators 
even if only 40% of the target is met.
There is an ethical question: should doctors be 
rewarded for providing high quality care for only 
some and not all of their patients? All indicators 
reach a plateau eventually: their ability to infl uence 
and motivate better standards of care levels off over 
time. It is necessary to consider when to retire some 
indicators and when to create new ones to keep the 
fi nancial reward scheme relevant.
A choice has to be made between emphasizing 
process, outcome and impact indicators. Processes, 
e.g. measurement of HbA1c in diabetic patients, are 
easy to capture, however they do not automatically 
lead to desired outcomes. Outcomes, e.g. HbA1c 
levels below 7%, are of interest, however case mix 
needs to be taken into account for targets to be consi-
dered fair. Impact, e.g. number of hospitalizations 
due to diabetes, is of ultimate interest, however it is 
diffi cult to associate the activities of the Family Health 
Programme teams directly with these broader changes 
in health. Often a blend of all three might be required. 
Macinko et al7 (2007) have developed a validated 
primary care evaluation tool for the Family Health 
Programme that could be a useful starting point for 
the standardisation of performance monitoring across 
different Family Health Programme teams.
Exception reporting
If a GP has been unable to meet a target, it might not 
have been from lack of effort or poor performance. 
The QOF has some fl exibility in this regard called 
‘Exception Reporting’. GPs are allowed to exclude 
patients (‘exceptions’) from the performance target 
when it is appropriate to do so but they can only do this 
if the patient fulfi ls one or more of the following criteria:
• The indicator is not appropriate in the patient’s case
• Appropriate services are not available
• The patient is already on the maximum tolerated or 
permitted dosage of a treatment
• The patient has an allergy to the medication
• The patient has a co-morbidity of greater severi-
tyThe patient refuses treatment
There are considerable differences in Exception 
Reporting rates between different GP practices and 
in some municipalities, there are GP practices that 
Exception Report several times more patients than 
other GP practices.11,g Should these practices be 
rewarded in the same way as the other practices? The 
GP practice, the patient register and even patients’ 
notes are subject to annual review. However, this is 
not a particularly well audited or enforced area and 
the system is susceptible to fraudulent behaviour. In 
the Family Health Programme, therefore, P4P schemes 
should allow some fl exibility whilst at the same time 
ensure proper safeguards against fraud.
Prevalence
The local prevalence of a disease is not considered in 
the QOF and GPs working in low socioeconomic areas 
become disadvantaged relative to colleagues in weal-
thier areas. In areas that have a very high prevalence of 
a particular disease, reaching the target for an indicator 
in that disease area will be more challenging and require 
more resources, time and effort by the doctor than in 
areas that have a very low prevalence. The incentive 
payment per patient becomes less than for clinicians in 
wealthier areas. Some GPs have argued for a review of 
the payment formula so that health inequalities are not 
worsened. In the Family Health Programme, therefore, 
P4P schemes should take into account local epidemio-
logy and provide a weighted reward for performance.
Team working and changing roles
The emphasis on reaching targets has generated a target 
culture which is inappropriate in primary care. Primary 
care cannot be easily broken down into small, measu-
rable parts and is complex, messy and dynamic. Not 
everything that can be measured is of value, and that 
which cannot be measured may, nonetheless, be of high 
value. QOF has changed attitudes within GP practices; 
GPs treat patients more as a collection of measurable 
indicators than as an individual.3 Patients are called 
back to the GP practice on multiple occasions so that 
procedures, examinations and tests can be carried out, 
the sole purpose of which is to fulfi l and reach desired 
QOF targets. In the Family Health Programme, P4P 
schemes should enhance not detract from good quality 
primary care, and doctors must not lose sight of the 
patient within this process.
Reward structures
The QOF uses fi nancial payments linked to performance 
measures to reward GPs and the payments are directed 
towards the GP practice at the end of the fi nancial year. 
In the UK, GPs are independent contractors to the State, 
g National Health Service (UK). Information Centre. Quality and Outcomes Framework Exceptions Data 2009/10. London; 2010[cited 2011 
Jul 12]. Available from: http://www.ic.nhs.uk/webfi les/QOF/2009-10/Exception/QOF_Exceptions_Bulletin_2009-10_v1.0.pdf
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and although the payment goes to the GP practice as a 
whole, the GP who owns that practice can decide how 
the rewards should be best divided and allocated; it bols-
ters salaries, in particular for the GP. However, primary 
care performance is stochastic, it is team-based – many 
professionals are involved and it is diffi cult to deter-
mine directly whose effort it was that led to a positive 
outcome. Without careful attention, P4P schemes can 
cause dissention and attrition between health professio-
nals of different disciplines. Rewards for the team as a 
whole would be a better incentive structure.
Furthermore, fi nancial rewards like the QOF attends to 
one of the very lowest of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
and motivation.8 There are many other rewards that can 
be considered to motivate health professionals other than 
fi nancial ones. For example, building reputation, training, 
attending conferences, supporting self-actualization, 
career promotion, and space to innovate and be creative 
within the workplace. These are likely to be more effec-
tive motivators of good performance in health professio-
nals than simply paying them more. P4P schemes should 
be creative in the use of different types of incentives in 
the Family Health Programme and consider rewarding 
all health professionals, not just the doctors.
CONCLUSION
P4P systems can be useful to bring about an improve-
ment in quality of care and health outcomes in some 
areas sensitive to primary care activities. However, 
they are very expensive to develop and maintain, 
requiring complex information technology systems, 
and can distort the priorities of healthcare professio-
nals. Financial incentives exist in the Brazilian Unifi ed 
Health Care System (Sistema Único de Saúde – SUS) 
but these are for municipalities to create Family Health 
Programme teams, rather than to improve their perfor-
mance. The growing interest in P4P schemes in the 
Family Health Programme is complicated by the relati-
vely weak performance monitoring culture at municipal 
and state levelsh and there are few systematic attempts to 
analyse routine data sets e.g. (Sistema de Informação da 
Atenção Básica). Macinko et al7 (2007:174) noted that a 
major challenge for the Family Health Programme will 
be to ‘develop and use systems to monitor and improve 
the quality of care delivered in order to maximize the 
potential health gains of this innovative approach to 
integrated primary care delivery’.
Based on the experiences of the QOF in the UK, there 
are important principles that Brazilian municipalities 
should consider before embarking on a P4P scheme:
• Is there consensus around the indicator set?
• Is there an evidence base for the indicator?
• Are the targets reasonable and an ethical use of 
resources?
• Can indicator performance be evaluated and can 
they be retired and renewed as necessary?
• Is the local context and case mix being taken into 
account in the measurement of doctor performance?
• Can performance data be independently verifi ed 
and audited on a regular basis?
• Is the P4P having a negative impact on team roles, 
the doctor-patient relationship and the patient 
experience?
• Is the reward and incentive structure the most 
appropriate one for the professionals in the Family 
Health Programme?
The growing interest in P4P schemes in Brazil should 
be an opportunity to develop experimental studies 
so that the impact and value of the incentives can be 
properly evaluated.
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